This chapter sketches a phenomenological account of impaired agency in depression.
1 The question of how depression affects the ability to act has not received much attention from philosophers. However, there is a recent account by Roberts (2001) , which proposes that people with depression fail to act because of an inability to satisfy their desires due to loss of affect. There is a "failure to be able to achieve affective satisfaction of their desires" (2001, p.54) . A problem with this view is that people with depression not only decline to act; they also complain that action seems impossible. Realising that one will not get any satisfaction from an action is not the same as taking that action to be beyond one"s abilities.
free: schizophrenic patients suffering from the delusion that their will is manipulated and their thoughts controlled by others, and alongside of them, deterministic philosophers. To be sure, the latter admit that we are experiencing our will as though it were free, but this, they say, is a self-deception. (Frankl, 1973, p.14) Experience of free will is also presupposed by recent debates concerning whether or not free will is an illusion: if we did not have an experience of free will, we could not have an illusory experience of it. For example, Libet (2004) not only assumes that we have an awareness of willing something to happen but further claims that the "conscious will to act" can be timed. However, as others have noted, it is far from clear what the alleged experience consists of (e.g. Holton, 2009, p.416) . And not everyone accepts Libet"s assumption that actions are experienced as initiated by "volitions". For instance, it is arguable that our phenomenology better complements "agent-causation" approaches, according to which agents rather than volitions are the causes of actions. But we can ask the same question here -is there an experience of agent causation and, if so, what does it involve? Again, the matter is unclear,
prompting Nichols (2004, p.491) to dismiss the idea of such an experience as "phenomenologically implausible".
There is thus a tension between the widespread intuition that we experience our actions as free and the elusiveness of the experience. I suggest that this tension is symptomatic of our looking in the wrong place. Our freedom is not, principally, something we experience as internal to ourselves, an episodic feeling associated with the initiation of certain actions. Instead, all actions (along with any feelings or "qualia" that might be associated with acting or being about to act) presuppose an experience of freedom. This experience consists simply of the world; the sense that we are free is written into the experienced world. I will show how this view facilitates a plausible interpretation of what people with depression often report: an impaired ability to act that is inextricable from "living in a different world".
Kinds of Action
What kinds of action do we experience as "free" in the relevant sense? If we can establish this much, then we will at least know where to look in order to characterise the experience. The sort of action that Libet (e.g. 2004) instructed his experimental subjects to perform -flicking a wrist without any forethought -is not a good candidate. As Lowe (2008, p.85 ) points out, they were effectively asked "not to exercise their will" and instead to let the urge somehow "creep up on them unawares". Furthermore, it is arguable that free will is not simply a matter of initiating bodily movements. When one performs a goal-directed action, such as reaching for a pen, crossing the road or drinking from a glass of water, every movement of a finger, hand, arm or leg does not constitute a discrete free action -that would be the wrong level of description. If there is an experience of free will, it is associated with purposive activities, such as "crossing the road in order to go to the shop" (Gallagher, 2006) . So flicking a wrist is not a typical free action but a movement that would ordinarily contribute to such an action, which is artificially abstracted from its usual context. Let us concede that certain behaviours contribute to actions, rather than being actions, and that others, such as flicking a wrist, may be dubious candidates for free actions.
That still leaves us with many different candidate behaviours. Consider the following: 1) Thinking through a problem when there is not much as stake, deciding to do something and then doing it 2) Making a choice that will have a significant effect upon one"s life, with which various conflicting emotions are associated 3) Performing a one-off goal-directed activity without any forethought, such as picking up a glass and drinking its contents 4) Unreflectively performing a habitual routine, such as cleaning one"s teeth in the morning 5) Making an impulsive ostensive gesture, in order to draw a companion"s attention to something exciting 6) Expressing anger at someone 7) Saying the word "phenomenology", rather than "experience", in a sentence where one could have used either term It is debatable how many different kinds of action there are and what distinguishes all of them from (a) a cluster of closely related actions, (b) an action component, and (c) a behaviour that is neither an action nor an action component. The above list is not intended to be exhaustive or to reflect a uniquely appropriate taxonomy of action. My aim is simply to illustrate the wide variety of actions and associated experiences.
Heading to the bathroom to brush one"s teeth is phenomenologically very different from deciding whether or not to marry somebody. What kinds of action are associated with an experience of freedom? Perhaps it is restricted to those that involve making a choice. However, it is difficult to pin down the scope of choice. Although one might restrict it to (1) and (2) above, it seems odd to say that I did not choose to clean my teeth, make a gesture or say a word. The intuition remains that I could have done otherwise in these cases.
There is a simple phenomenological case against the view that our experience of freedom consists of a "magic ingredient", added only to certain kinds of action. In short, we do not experience ourselves as mechanistically determined robots that are occasionally moved by a burst of freedom, thus making a subset of our activities stand out from all others. Our experience does not incorporate a clear distinction between a subset of actions that we experience as "free" and all our other behaviours. In what follows, I will defend the view that all our actions are experienced as free. This is consistent with what people with depression describe. Their impaired ability to act encompasses not just those actions that are preceded by deliberation or choice, but even activities that are ordinarily habitual, unthinking and effortless: "To get out of bed at midday was an ordeal" (anonymous, in Read and Reynolds eds, 1996, p.35 ).
In the next two sections, I draw first upon Edmund Husserl and then Jean-Paul Sartre, in order to argue that experience of freedom is neither an inchoate internal feeling nor an episode that accompanies some instances of action. Rather, it is an ordinarily constant background to all our activities -our choices presuppose that we are free to act, rather than constituting an experience of freedom. Because our actions are experienced as free even when we do not explicitly "choose" them or "will" them to occur, I refer more often to a sense of "freedom" than to "free will". And this freedom, I argue, is a way of experiencing the world.
Horizons
A first step towards characterising the phenomenology of freedom is acknowledging that world-experience incorporates perception of possibility. A detailed case for this is "practically accessible to others" and as "accessible through one or more sensory modalities". However, the kinds of possibility we perceive are, I suggest, more wideranging than this. Husserl appreciates that, in everyday life, we do not experience entities indifferently -they present themselves as practically significant in a range of ways:
add to this Husserl"s distinction between possibilities that are "enticing" and others that are not. Husserl is concerned with perceptual enticement, with the way in which perceived objects sometimes call upon us to actualise further perceptual possibilities by moving in certain ways (e.g. Husserl, 2001, pp.83-91; p.196) . However, it is just as plausible, in my view, to extend the point to possibilities for goal-directed action.
Something could appear practically significant (e.g. useable for some task) without drawing us in or repelling us, whereas other perceived possibilities incorporate an "affective force". There is a difference between a pint of beer that says "you could drink me" and one that says "drink me now".
Husserl suggests that our ability to experience possibilities is enabled, at least in part, by our having certain kinds of bodily disposition. The body [Leib] is the "medium" or "organ" of "all perception" and thus shapes all our experiences of the world (1989, p.61) . More specifically, a sense of potential movements, which Husserl calls "kinaestheses", is also a perception of the possibilities that things offer us:
There is thus a freedom to run through the appearances in such a way that I move my eyes, my head, alter the posture of my body, go around the object, direct my regard toward it, and so on. We call these movements, which belong to the essence of perception and serve to bring the object of perception to givenness from all sides insofar as possible, kinaestheses. (Husserl, 1973, pp.83-4) We can thus extract from Husserl"s work the view that (a) perception incorporates various different kinds of possibility, some of which are significant to us in one way or another, and (b) perception of worldly possibility is inextricable from our bodily phenomenology. It is through the perceiving (as opposed to perceived) body that we experience our surroundings.
Elsewhere, I have argued that the contribution made by various kinds of possibility to experience can be illustrated by reflecting upon forms of anomalous experience where certain kinds of possibility are absent. The result is that everything looks somehow different in ways that are difficult to describe. Along with this, the overall structure of one"s relationship with the world is altered (e.g. Ratcliffe, 2008) . For instance, everything might seem oddly intangible, altogether bereft of practical potentialities and tactual possibilities more generally. As some kinds of possibility are lost, others can become more pronounced -one"s surroundings might offer only the possibility of threat. Another alteration in the space of experienced possibility involves a diminished sense of things being experientially and practically accessible to others; everything appears as "for me". In contrast, there is a form of estrangement where the world continues to offer possibilities for others, which present themselves as "impossible for me". An appreciation that experiential changes like these can occur allows one to interpret first-person reports that otherwise seem paradoxical, where everything looks exactly as it previously did and yet somehow utterly different. An example of this is what Jaspers (1963, p.98 ) calls "delusional mood" or "delusional atmosphere". Even though a detailed description of what is perceptually present might incorporate exactly the same inventory of properties as before, the system of perceived possibilities has changed and things therefore look somehow different in a way that people struggle to articulate (Ratcliffe, forthcoming, a) .
Sartre on Freedom
If we allow that world-experience incorporates various different kinds of possibility, we can see how the experience of freedom associated with action might be integral to the experienced world. The kinds of possibility that the world incorporates include "I can". The possibility of my doing p or doing q is there, built into our surroundings.
And this kind of possibility is phenomenologically distinguishable from others, such as "p might happen", "p might happen to me" or "someone else could do p". Our being presented with the "I can", along with other kinds of possibility that it can be distinguished from, is what constitutes our sense of freedom. Perhaps the best statement of such a view is that of Sartre, and I will focus upon four claims that he makes about freedom:
1. The experience of freedom involves being presented with a world that incorporates various kinds of possibility, including "I can".
2. All action is free; action preceded by reflective choice is only one kind of free action.
3. The experience of freedom is inextricable from our bodily phenomenology.
4. The fundamental project that gives meaning to all one"s actions is itself a choice.
I will accept (1), (2) The possible appears to us as a property of things. After glancing at the sky I state "It is possible that it may rain." I do not understand the possible here as meaning "without contradiction with the present state of the sky." The possibility belongs to the sky as threat; it represents a surpassing on the part of these clouds, which I perceive, toward rain. (Sartre, 1989, p.97) He also indicates that the experience of being free is a matter of being presented with possibilities. When we act, we do not perceive a purely factual state of affairs, think about the discrepancy between it and some preferred situation, and then experience an internal mental state of "desire". Rather, a situation appears to us as lacking in some way and thus solicits a certain kind of action (Sartre, 1989, p.433) . However, it is also clear from Sartre"s account that, however much the world might call for a certain action, that action is still presented as something we could do, rather than something we are compelled to do.
6 Take his well-known example of walking along the edge of a precipice and feeling afraid. Sartre stresses that the fear is a way of experiencing one"s surroundings; they appear as offering the "possibility of my life being changed from without". Hence the precipice also invites me to act in a certain way; it "presents itself to me as to be avoided" (Sartre, 1989, pp.29-30) . However, moving away from the edge is not given as something I must do. And the revelation that nothing compels me to act in this way consists, according to Sartre, in a feeling of "anguish". However, he also maintains that I am free even when I am not reflectively aware of my freedom in this way. My unreflective experience of freedom consists in the simple fact of the world"s offering significant possibilities that I might actualise, such as backing away from the cliff, and offering them as possibilities rather than inevitabilities. Action is experienced as the actualisation of worldly possibilities, and this applies to unthinking, habitual action too: "the consciousness of man in action is non-reflective consciousness" (Sartre, 1989, p.36) . One might argue that the experience of possibility is merely epistemic; it is a matter of ignorance over what will happen rather than an experience of freedom. Some of the possibilities we experience do indeed reflect lack of knowledge. However, it would be phenomenologically implausible to maintain that "I can do p or q" takes that form. The experience is quite different from "I don"t know what will happen next". Even if one knows what one will do, the relevant course of action presents itself as one possibility amongst others, none of which one is compelled to actualise.
For Sartre, the kinds of significance that experienced entities have are symptomatic of the kinds of projects we are already knowingly or unknowingly committed to. Insofar as I strive to be a good philosopher, a book might appear enticing, a talk interesting, a negative review of my work hurtful, and so on. Our projects thus shape not only the possibilities for action that the world offers but various other kinds of significance too. Sartre claims that even significant events that we have no control over dependin a way -upon our freedom. A being that cared for nothing, that strove for nothing, could not be obstructed, threatened or disappointed. Things only affect us in these ways because we already have certain concerns, and we choose those concerns by choosing the projects we pursue (Sartre, 1989, p.494 According to Sartre, all our activities and projects, all the ways in which we find things significant, can be traced back to an original project that is chosen: "all these trivial passive expectations of the real, all these commonplace, everyday values, derive their meaning from an original project of myself which stands as my choice of myself in the world" (Sartre, 1989, p.39) . I reject this last claim on phenomenological grounds. 8 All projects ultimately presuppose a structure that is not chosen. Whether it is x, y or z that one encounters as frightening, enticing or useful might depend upon the project one has chosen to pursue. However, in order to have any kind of project, one must have the capacity to find things significant in such ways. And that capacity is not chosen. So the ways in which we find things significant, the possibilities that they offer us, are not wholly attributable to a choice of projects. Only if one is already capable of experiencing threat can one find a specific entity threatening, and only if one already has a sense of being able to actualise possibilities in the form of "I can" is one able to have any kind of project. Hence the phenomenology of freedom does not originate in an ungrounded choice but in a modal structure (a sense of the kinds of significant possibility that entities in the world can incorporate), which is presupposed by the intelligibility of pursuing a project. And, as I will illustrate when I return to the phenomenology of depression, that structure is changeable. Although I depart from Sartre"s position here, this does not preclude endorsement of his other claims. I agree with Sartre that the phenomenology of freedom is a matter of experiencing one"s actions as responses to significant worldly possibilities, that freedom is not restricted to reflective choices, and that many of the possibilities we perceive are symptomatic of projects that frame our activities. Furthermore, freedom does indeed extend to 7 Sartre also acknowledges that our possibilities are shaped and thus, in some sense, "constrained" by a social world of shared meanings. However, he says that these constraints are not experienced as limits. We do not miss possibilities that were not incorporated into the experienced world to begin with (Sartre, 1989, p.531) . 8 Indeed, just about everybody who has discussed Sartre"s "original choice" rejects the idea. For example, Merleau-Ponty (1962, pp.441-453) claims that it is our "habitual being in the world" that gives things the significance they have and that the significant situation we find ourselves immersed in when we choose is not itself a choice.
some of those projects that form a habitual backdrop to our activities; people sometimes do make radical choices that change the structure of their lives.
For Sartre, as for Husserl, the experience of worldly possibility is essentially bodily in character. He offers a transcendental argument to the effect that having a body is a necessary condition for thought, action and choice:
In fact if the ends which I pursue could be attained by a purely arbitrary wish, if it were sufficient to hope in order to obtain, and if definite rules did not determine the use of instruments, I could never distinguish within me desire from will, nor dream from act, nor the possible from the real. (Sartre, 1989, p.327) If our capacities were unlimited, to wish would be to be to get, and the distinction between desire, choice and action would break down. Having a body, and thus a contingent set of capacities, is a requirement for the ability to distinguish between wanting, having, desiring, needing, willing and acting. As Sartre puts it, "the body is the contingent form which is taken up by the necessity of my contingency" (1989, p.328) ; freedom requires the limitations imposed by a body but it does not require those limitations to take any specific form. The phenomenology of freedom does not implicate the body as an object of experience. For Sartre, our bodily capacities and dispositions manifest themselves as the system of possibilities that we take as integral to the experienced world: "the world as the correlate of the possibilities which I am appears from the moment of my upsurge as the enormous skeletal outline of all my possible actions" (Sartre, 1989, p.322) . However, the specific form that this "outline" takes is not determined solely by the body. For example, Sartre says that bodily fatigue is experienced as a way in which the "surrounding world" appears, but how exactly it is experienced depends upon what projects one is committed to (1989, p.454 ).
I will now apply this approach to the phenomenology of depression. Experiences of incapability in depression are, I suggest, plausibly interpreted if we accept the following:
References to "stealing away whoever you are" and "preventing you from seeing who you might someday be" could be interpreted in terms of losing one or more projects that are central to one"s life. Things appear significant in the ways they do partly in virtue of the possibilities that we seek to actualise through our projects. Hence, with a loss of these projects, the entities and situations we encounter do not offer what they once did or solicit action in the way they did, thus accounting for a diminished will to act. One can only look back and recall a time when the world was alive with possibilities that are now gone. The abandonment of a life-shaping project need not be self-initiated; various events can conspire to put an end to it. For example, someone"s life might be dedicated to the upkeep of a rare artefact that is reduced to ashes by vandals.
Hence one way of construing the inability to act in depression is in terms of the loss, there is a feeling of being unable to act, even though one retains various concerns and appreciates that certain actions are appropriate in the context of those concerns. In the other case, which I will focus on here, those concerns are absent too. So there is a more profound loss: a sense of anything being potentially relevant to any project is gone. It is not merely that one fails to experience entities as significant; one can't.
Everything one encounters is stripped of experienced possibilities for action that it previously incorporated, and world experience as a whole is thus altered in structure.
This loss is at the same time an impoverishment of freedom, of the experienced world as a realm of possibilities that might be actualised by one"s activities. Such a predicament is described with remarkable clarity in the following first-person account:
….it was as if the whatness of each thing -I"m no good at philosophical vocabularybut the essence of each thing in the sense of the tableness of the table or the chairness of the chair or the floorness of the floor was gone. There was a mute and indifferent object in that place. Its availability to human living, to human dwelling in the world was drained out of it. Its identity as a familiar object that we live with each day was gone. [….] the world had lost its welcoming quality. It wasn"t a habitable earth any longer. [….] It became impossible to reach anything. Like, how do I get up and walk to that chair if the essential thing that we mean by chair, something that lets us sit down and rest or upholds us as we read a book, something that shares our life in that way, has lost the quality of being able to do that? (quoted by Hornstein, 2009, pp.212-3) When all experienced entities lose their practical familiarity and cease to solicit activity, the world no longer incorporates possibilities for action. But, even here, "practical significance" at least remains intelligible. As the author goes on to say, "I never fell to that extreme, of not knowing that other ways of being existed. I always knew, through all those years, that I was trying to find my way back, that there was another way to be" (quoted by Hornstein, 2009, p.214) . Even when faced with an allpervasive loss of experienced practical significance, one might still be able to contemplate the possibility of one"s finding things significant again and thus of pursuing some as yet unformulated project. And, even if that were gone too, one might retain an appreciation that things continue to be significant in these ways for other people. However, it is arguable that -in some cases -the loss goes so deep that the person is unable to make sense of the possibility of anything being practically significant for anyone:
But in among the bad and worse times, there were also moments when I felt, if not hope, then at least the glimmerings of possibility. […..] It was like starting from the beginning. It took me a long time, for example, to understand, or to re-understand, why people do things. Why, in fact, they do anything at all. What is it that occupies their time? What is the point of doing? During my long morning walks, I watched people hurrying along in suits and trainers. Where was it they were going, and why were they in such haste? I simply couldn"t imagine feeling such urgency. I watched others throwing a ball for a dog, picking it up, and throwing it again. Why? Where was the sense in such repetition? (Brampton, 2008, p.249) The return of "possibility" described here serves to make salient what was previously diminished or lost -a sense of what it is for someone to act purposively, to find things significant and respond to them accordingly. Activities such as playing with a ball or hurrying to a destination had become strange, without meaning.
It is important to emphasise that "practical significance" is not the only kind of experienced significance that is affected in depression. For instance, changes in the structure of interpersonal experience (although not my principal focus in this chapter)
are absolutely central to some, if not all, forms of depression (Ratcliffe, forthcoming, b) . Sufferers often report an inability to relate to others, which sometimes involves a need for emotional connection that cannot be met because experiences of others fail to incorporate its possibility. In some instances, there is a pervasive sense of vulnerability that is incompatible with the possibility of emotional connection:
"sufferers yearn for connection, seem bereft because of their isolation, and yet are rendered incapable of being with others in a comfortable way" (Karp, 1996, p.14) . A change of this kind, involving loss of various kinds of possibility that people and the social world more usually offer, has a profound effect upon one"s sense of agency.
Given the extent to which the experienced world is permeated by possibilities involving other people, our sense of "practical significance" and our sense of "interpersonal possibility" are inextricable -what affects one will inevitably affect the other in some way too.
Depression not only involves the absence or even the felt absence of certain kinds of possibility from experience. Other kinds of significant possibility can become more salient. For instance, whereas only some things used to appear threatening, threat might now become something that all experienced entities offer. 10 The normal sense of being solicited to act by the world is not only lost but replaced by an allencompassing threat before which one is passive and helpless. The feeling of impotence that many people report is at least partly attributable to this. For example:
At that time ordinary objects -chairs, tables and the like -possessed a frightening, menacing quality which is very hard to describe vividly in the way that I was then affected. It was as though I lived in some kind of hell, containing nothing from which I could obtain relief or comfort. (Patient quoted by Rowe, 1978, pp.269-70) William Styron similarly complains of a pervasive change in the significance of his surroundings that began in the early stages of depression. They "took on a different tone at certain times: the shadows of nightfall seemed more somber, my mornings were less buoyant, walks in the wood became less zestful". He later describes how his "beloved farmhouse" took on "an almost palpable quality of ominousness" (2001, pp.41-44 There are, I think, two things going on here, working together. Experienced entities are drained of their usual significance and the world is bereft of any positive enticement for action; it no longer draws one in and thus seems distant, detached, not quite there. The bodily correlate of this is a feeling of fatigue, lethargy and weight. In addition to this, everything is enveloped by a different kind of significance, which only certain things previously had; the world takes on the form of threat, the result being a paralysing and inescapable sense of dread. It is debatable whether or not one could live in a world bereft of potentialities for action without at the same time having some degree of passive dread, but the two aspects of the experience can certainly vary in their salience. Despite such differences, the experiences that sufferers describe are 11 Law (2009) offers the complementary view that, in depression, a change in how one perceives the world does not cause loss of motivation. Instead, perception incorporates motivation. He adds that the change need not simply be understood in terms of loss. Rather, something could be added that blocks action. An experience of the world as threat, amongst other things, might play that role. 12 From a conference presentation by Outi Benson (SANE), entitled "Using the Grounded Theory Method to explore Emotional Experience associated with Self-cutting" (July 2010).
united by a common theme. As Dorothy Rowe (1978, p.30) notes, an experience of confinement or incarceration is reported by almost everyone:
While different people describe their experience of depression in different ways, there is one feature that they all share. Each person describes the experience as one of being enclosed. Some say it is like being in a dark prison cell, some say it is like being at the bottom of a deep hole, some say it is like being wrapped in impenetrable cloth, some say it"s like being enclosed by thick, soundproofed glass. The images vary, but the underlying concept is the same. The person is in solitary confinement.
This can be understood in terms of altered experience of possibilities. In the most extreme case, because the world incorporates no sense of possibilities for action by oneself or others, it also incorporates no sense of the potential for significant change.
The predicament that one finds oneself in thus appears timeless and inescapable -it incorporates the sense that "this is all there is or could be". In other cases, the sense that the possibilities still exist for others but not for oneself constitutes a sense of being alienated, cut off from the social world, imprisoned. And, in those instances where a feeling of dread is salient, the only possibility for change that the world offers is the actualisation of some inchoate threat before which one is passive. All of these amount, I suggest, to a diminishment of experienced freedom: loss of world is loss of will. Many sufferers describe their predicament as akin to having died; it is eternal, inescapable and involves a sense of utter estrangement from other people and from any set of potential practical concerns (e.g. Kaysen, 2001, p.32; Wurtzel, 1996, p.19) .
Hence various subtly different kinds of experience might be associated with a diagnosis such as "major depression". Variables include the extent to which practical significance is lost, whether and to what extent the world appears in the guise of threat and no doubt other factors too. Here are six different kinds of experience that might be associated both with diminished agency and a diagnosis of depression, although I do not wish to rule out others:
1. A loss of some fundamental project. The world no longer offers certain possibilities for action it once did and nothing has yet replaced them. However, one does not lack
an appreciation of what it would be for the world to have those possibilities and one also recognises that other people retain them.
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2. Loss of enticing possibilities. The world might still incorporate meaningful projects but its allure is gone and it no longer solicits action.
3. A more encompassing loss, where a sense of anything incorporating possibilities for activity is absent from experience. One is unable to experience anything as practically significant.
4. An even deeper loss, involving an inability to conceive of ever regaining a sense of significant possibility in one"s life. However, one retains a sense that others have meaningful possibilities. This exacerbates a feeling of being oddly cut off from them.
5. A complete absence of any sense that anything could be significant for anyone, amounting to a world that is bereft of the usual sense of freedom.
6. An all-enveloping passivity before some threat, which exacerbates the inability to act in cases where loss of practical significance is only partial.
It seems plausible to suggest that (1) to (5) could all occur with some degree of (6).
For example, in the case of (1), the world might still incorporate the possibility of having a shower or getting out of bed, but such activities present themselves as daunting, frightening, or even practically impossible. The world thus offers the possibility of doing x but at the same time incorporates a sense of x as impossible. All experience takes on the form "you can"t", analogous to a staircase that appears climbable but at the same time too steep to climb. Hence (6) exacerbates (1). In addition, (6) surely entails a form (2), given that experiencing the world in terms of all-encompassing threat blocks any positive solicitation to act. However, it also seems that (6) is not an inevitable correlate of any of (1) 13 It is debatable whether or when cases of this type warrant a diagnosis of depression. A profound change in life-shaping projects is an inevitable correlate of the death of a close family member or the loss of a job to which one was dedicated. But grief and unemployment do not automatically lead to depression. However, where one fails to move on from grief or job loss, the label "depression" is more plausible. There are also cases where one "gives up" on projects that were previously central to one"s life, despite there being no outward change in one"s circumstances. It is similarly debatable whether and when they are attributable to "depression".
habitual behaviours may continue, albeit in the context of a radically altered experience of the world and one"s place in it. And one might also act in response to a sense of threat, cowering and retreating from a world that offers nothing else. But what remains is still a distortion and impoverishment of the more usual experience of freedom.
Another respect in which the phenomenology of depression complements Sartre"s account of freedom is the role of bodily experience. People with depression report a wide range of bodily complaints. As Styron (2001, pp.42-3) puts it, "I felt a kind of numbness, an enervation, but more particularly an odd fragility -as if my body had actually become frail, hypersensitive and somehow disjointed and clumsy, lacking normal coordination". He also describes how later, during recovery, he felt as though he was "no longer a husk but a body with some of the body"s sweet juices stirring again" (2001, p.75) . Numerous other accounts similarly describe changes in bodily experience, and authors often remark on how difficult it is to dissociate bodily changes from changes in the world. Their testimony is thus consistent with the Sartrean view that bodily experience and worldly possibility are inextricable. A loss of worldly possibilities is at the same time a loss of vitality, and the correlate of a world that offers nothing is a cumbersome, conspicuous, awkward and painful body (Fuchs, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2009). 14 
Conclusions
I propose that we employ a broadly Sartrean interpretive framework in order to illuminate alterations in the experience of freedom and agency that can occur in depression. In so far as that framework coheres with first-person testimony and makes sense of otherwise obscure phenomena, it is itself vindicated in the process. In addition, there is the possibility of revising and refining our phenomenological account through engagement with the experience of depression. Sartre insists that even the most exceptional circumstances leave our freedom intact. For example, he writes that "the red hot pincers of the torturer do not exempt us from being free" 14 A 2011 questionnaire study, which I carried out with colleagues as part of the project "Emotional Experience in Depression: a Philosophical Study", serves to illustrate the prevalence and prominence of bodily symptoms. Of 139 people responded to the question "how does your body feel when you"re depressed?", only two reported no bodily symptoms and two others were unsure. One or more of the words "tired", "lethargic", "heavy" and "exhausted" appeared in 96 of the responses, and all of the remainder included comparable complaints of lacking energy and feeling drained or fatigued. (Sartre, 1989, p.505) . However, reflection upon the experience of depression suggests that matters are more complicated than this. The structure of our experience of freedom is changeable, and it can be impoverished in a number of different ways.
Through studying first-person accounts of depression, we can begin to describe some of these and, in the process, to further clarify what an intact sense of freedom consists of. This is at odds with Sartre"s own view. In his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, he offers an account of "melancholy", according to which the "potentialities of our world" initially remain intact but our means of actualising them are obstructed. For example, one might lose one"s car due to financial problems and thus require an alternative means of transport. He proposes that melancholy is a way of avoiding such life adjustments by "transforming the present structure of the world, replacing it with a totally undifferentiated structure" (1994, p.44 ). The result is that the world altogether lacks significance and no longer solicits action. This change, he maintains, does not compromise our freedom. In fact, it is an exercise of our freedom. Even if we were to accept something along these lines, it could only account for the first of the variants I listed in the previous section, where one loses certain core projects and, with them, a range of ways in which things appeared significant. It does not accommodate (3), where one is unable to find anything significant, unless we maintain that the sense of inability is somehow illusory. And it does not account for variants (4) and (5) either. In these cases, it is not just that however many things lose their significance or even that one is unable to find things significant. In addition, certain kinds of significant possibility lose their intelligibility. Whereas (1) is compatible with intact freedom, cases (3) to (5) amount to an alteration in the phenomenological structure of freedom, regardless of whether or not they are accompanied by (6). (2) also amounts to such an alteration (albeit a less profound one), so long as we accept that the person is incapable of finding anything enticing, rather than maintaining -in line with Sartre"s view -that a lack of enticement from the world is symptomatic of something chosen.
I have not addressed whether and how the impoverishment of freedom that occurs in depression differs from that associated with other kinds of psychiatric illness, and other circumstances too. For instance, the account of freedom I have sketched here
can also be applied to anomalous experiences and disturbances of agency that are reported in schizophrenia. In Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl (Sechehaye, 1970) , a well-known autobiographical account of schizophrenia, the author -Reneedescribes a profound change in experience of self and world. Madness, she says, is a "country" that is "opposed to reality", a different world (1970, p.44) . It is clear from her account that the change in her world is attributable, at least in part, to a shift in the kinds of possibility it incorporates. For instance, it is altogether bereft of practical significance: "When, for example, I looked at a chair or a jug, I thought not of their use or function -a jug not as something to hold water and milk, a chair not as something to sit in -but as having lost their names, their functions and meanings" (1970, pp.55-6) . It is in the context of this altered world that Renee experienced symptoms such as thought insertion, and was hospitalised after she followed an order from "The System" to put her hand in the fire (1970, p.61) . At one point, she describes experiencing a return of significant possibility to the world and, with it, a restoration of her sense of agency:
…when we were outside I realized that my perception of things had completely (1970, pp.105-6) Again, we see how possibilities that are integral to the experienced world are inextricable from the capacity for action -a return of the significance of things is also a return of the sense that one can act upon them. 15 It is debatable how, precisely, the changes in freedom that characterise schizophrenia differ from those that feature in depression. 16 There clearly are differences, as severe depression involves losing the will to act, but not misattributing one"s agency to someone else. Hence a task for phenomenological enquiry, through its interaction with psychiatry and other contexts, is to refine an account of the various different forms that diminishment of freedom can take. This is not just a theoretical exercise. A better understanding of the nature of and differences between these predicaments may enhance the ability to empathise and inform therapy. Subtle phenomenological distinctions also have potential implications for pharmaceutical intervention, given the possibility of different forms of intervention proving effective for different predicaments. Furthermore, insofar as psychiatric classification systems draw upon distinctions between kinds of experience, phenomenology can inform classification. For example, it is arguable that classifications of "mental disorder" are insufficiently sensitive to the different forms that "loss of practical significance" can take. Hence, although I have only scratched the surface here, I hope that this chapter at least serves to indicate the potential fruitfulness of phenomenology in psychiatry and, indeed, psychiatry in phenomenology.
How, if at all, does any of this relate to the question of whether we are free? I have characterised the principal ingredient of freedom as a sense of being able to actualise, through our activities, possibilities that are experienced as belonging to the world. But the fact that we experience ourselves and the world in this way does not imply that possibilities really do reside in the world or that, when we act, we do actualise possibilities. One could maintain that, so far as the metaphysics is concerned, the phenomenology is irrelevant. Alternatively, one might attempt to formulate an argument for the reality of human freedom on the basis of phenomenology. In brief, it is arguable that, without a sense of there being worldly possibilities that one could actualise, one would not inhabit the kind of world that empirical enquiry presupposes and attempts to characterise -one would lack the usual "sense of reality". Thus any result of empirical enquiry denying that we actualise worldly possibilities would undermine its own intelligibility. Therefore, one could not coherently deny that we have freedom in the sense I have described. This seems to be Sartre"s position:
…the necessity of potentiality as a meaningful structure of perception appears clearly enough so that we need not insist on it here. Scientific knowledge, in fact, can neither overcome nor suppress the potentializing structure of perception. On the contrary science must presuppose it. (1989, p.197) If he is right, then most of us are free most of the time, and any attempt to maintain otherwise is ultimately self-defeating.
